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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the creation of an education historiography that allows what has been 
known as ‘history’ or ‘the past’ into a ‘spacious present’ for re-examining what ‘doctorate’ 
may be.  Unravelling ‘doctorate’ as it has been written in the past and bringing these stories 
into a present, offers the opportunity for re-thinking the concept ‘doctorate’ and re-figuring 
process.   
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Perhaps if the future existed, concretely and individually, as something that could be 
discerned by a better brain, the past would not be so seductive:  Its demands would be 
balanced by those of the future.   
Nabakov, Transparent Things, 1972 
 
The idea of ‘doctorate’ has survived many iterations since the first parchment was handed to 
that unknown first recipient eight hundred or so years ago in a cathedral in Europe.  A change 
in focus in the early 1800s allowed the PhD to become the first research degree along with 
Von Humboldt’s new idea of the research university in Germany.  The last twenty years has 
seen a further escalation of interest and subsequent directives.  In Australia the directives in 
the Kemp reports (1999a) and (1999b) led to major activity that resulted in the re-vision of 
pedagogy, practice and outcome for ‘doctorate’ based on funding, quality of research and 
research training and workplace outcomes amongst other things.  In some respects the idea of 
‘doctorate’ was appropriated from university to government.  ‘Doctorate’ could claim to have 
become a new industry within the industry of Higher Education with a set of demands, rules 
and a subsequent consensus placed upon it that are different and yet maybe the same as they 
were 800 or 200 years ago.   
 
One current consuming demand, ‘timely-completion’ may be something to investigate more 
fully at another time, however just a brief glance at Australian university websites and 
documents can tell us that this demand strongly affects university funding as well as other 
internal and specific matters regarding course structures, research training and supervision in 
21st century.  However, in Mediaeval Italy a ‘no-show’ or ‘non-completer’ meant the lecturer 
would not be paid by that particular student, maybe the lecturer went without his dinner and 
that was the end of the story (but we might assume his reputation and therefore his meal 
ticket could be on the decline).  Or we could look at the current requirement in some 
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universities for academic staff to hold or be working towards a doctorate and see that this is 
the same yet different from the situation that Master Jacobus de Farneto found when he was 
appointed to teach grammar at Bologna in 1384 at a stipend of fifty pounds Bolognese 
conditional on ‘take(ing) his doctor’s degree or at least the licentiate before next Christmas, 
otherwise he is to receive no salary’ (Thorndyke, p. 256).  How similar and how different?  If 
many statements from different ages about a specific issue were placed together, what could 
they tell us? Is there one truth or are there many?  Can the past affect what Nabakov goes on 
to describe as ‘a spectre of thought’ – the future?   
 
To historicise ‘doctorate’ requires investigating histories, statements and pictures written 
about doctorate in the past, and from the writing make a ‘critical and effective’ history (Dean, 
1994).  Through looking at the past this way may allow us to better understand present 
dilemmas with the concept ‘doctorate’.  However to historicise ‘doctorate’ is not to re-invent 
a wheel of traditional linear history or historical anecdote about a cause and effect 
development of doctorate, from the first named doctorate to the last.  To historicise is to undo 
or unravel what is in the doctorate archive and to interrogate what is found.  A useful start is 
to look at Foucault’s idea of archive (Foucault. (1989. p. 147), 
‘… cannot be described in its totality; and in its presence I is unavoidable.  It emerges in 
fragments, regions, and levels, more fully, no doubt, and with greater sharpness, the greater 
the time that separates us from it: at most were it not for the rarity of the documents, the 
greater chronological distance would be necessary to analyse it.  And yet could this 
description of the archive be justified, could it elucidate that which makes it possible, map 
out the place where it speaks, control its rights and duties, test and develop its concepts – at 
least at this stage of the search, when it can define its possibilities only in the moment of 
their realisation.’ 
 
In placing some of the known, forgotten or lesser seen artefacts, pictures / palimpsests from 
the archive into a space where ‘doctorate’ may be seen as familiar yet unfamiliar, is to allow 
it to speak for itself or as Paulson (1988) has argued, allows doctorate to ‘make its noise’ and 
so open up the ‘medium of its possibility’ or as Foucault says, ‘define its possibilities’ 
(Foucault, p. 147).   
 
The concept ‘doctorate’ and its possibility however are not in this space on their own.  For 
the concept ‘doctorate’ and its allied beliefs to have being, it has had and has collaborators or 
co-conspirators, and those of us who work in a university environment with postgraduate 
students or who are undertaking doctoral study are equal partners in creating this current 
‘story’.  We collaborate to create the current ‘doctorate’ discourse, we make it what it is now 
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and what it has the possibility of becoming.  This consensus of what the doctorate story is, is 
a fundamental agreement or set of agreements and is the heart of the matter in hand.  Because 
it is consensus it is difficult to see, invisible and also difficult to ‘say’.  The consensus has 
continuing ‘invisibility’ because it is so functional in practice.  We do it, believe it, without 
noticing.  This is what I call ‘weasel beliefs’.  Weasel beliefs pervade a discourse allowing 
little conscious awareness by those who are part of the discourse.  It could be however that 
now we are ‘in the moment of their realisation’ and some weasel beliefs about ‘doctorate’ 
from now and from before now are ripe for contradiction.   
 
One weasel belief about ‘doctorate’ that has recently enjoyed some exposure is useful as 
illustration.  This weasel belief says that a doctorate is the pinnacle of academic achievement.  
Many of us know it, think it and assume it.  In the archive there are also other statements in 
relation to the doctorate being a pinnacle of academic achievement that may throw the belief 
into disarray.  These statements have flagged trouble for the idea that doctorate is the 
pinnacle of academic achievement - ‘Honorary doctorates for Bee Gees’ (BBC, May 2004), 
and from 1986, ‘Joh Bjelke-Petersen … his doctorate conferral was a memorable one.  
Awarded an honorary doctorate in Political Science by University of Queensland’ 
(Crikey.com ND), or examples of serious and rigorous research degree projects reported in 
the media under headlines such as, ‘Super PhD Loses out to Blondes and Vampires’ (Sun 
Herald, 2003) and ‘Thesis preaches gay gospel on Jesus’ (Hobart Mercury, 2003).  All these 
items in the doctorate archive contribute to the on-going doctorate discourse, and the 
understanding of what doctorate is and it’s potential for ‘becoming’. 
 
‘Becoming’ in an historical context upsets the conventional and traditional idea of ‘history’.  
History in its traditional sense has already happened – it has been a sequence of events 
motivated by causalities that are unseen (often weasel beliefs) although they still operate.  
‘Before’, the way that history has been practiced, has been dictated by what Elizabeth 
Ermarth (2001) calls a myth of a past that is reiterated in many presents, she suggests ‘the 
unified vision seems almost a dream and its founding subject largely a myth’.  This could be 
a liberating concept when re-looking at ‘doctorate’ and its subsequent practice.   
 
Alan Munslow (1997, p.1) poses a core question when he asks ‘the extent to which history, as 
a discipline, can accurately recover and represent the content of the past through narrative’.  
This is narrative is seen as an on-going story, and includes the notion of one historical truth 
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and a continuing chronological time-frame.  Within a traditional approach to history the ‘true’ 
story is arrived at through rigorous, objective, disinterested methodological research using 
primary source documents and frames the discovered material within linear chronological 
time that relies on ‘cause and effect’ to produce an accurate reconstruction of events that 
‘happened’ in the past.  While the rigour of historical method for extracting ‘doctorate’ 
material from the archive is both necessary and scholarly, the use to which we put the 
material and the framework chosen to display is of concern.   
 
A linear chronology invites the opinion that history is a ‘process of ‘advances’ towards a 
sophisticated present from a primitive past’ (Bentley, 1999) and is essentially non-
problematic and representational.  It says that ‘the real intentions of the dead can still address 
us today’, (Munslow, 2003).  This linear approach to understanding history is seen in the 
imagination as re-breathing life into the past and is evidenced by the increasingly popular 
television and film re-enactments of historical ‘events’.  It says the ‘truth’ is out there waiting 
to be discovered and re-discovered as a visitable place and that time is its ‘keeper’.   
 
That said however, it is useful to look at a chronology of ‘doctorate’ - for example Ian Rae’s 
paper A False Start for the PhD in Australia offers impeccable evidence for the beginnings of 
the doctorate in Australia, but what we see here is an unproblematic account that tells a safe 
story.  It does not seek to undo or to unsettle or to make trouble for the concept and this is 
something to bear in mind for further along.  If there are too many repetitions of the same old 
stories, we are in danger of creating further weasel beliefs which are in themselves alibis for 
something else.   
 
A more useful ‘history’ approach for historicising doctorate can be found with some of the 
postmodern historians.  They alert us to openings for the possibility of ‘doctorate’ through a 
different relationship with before now and can signal a way of seeing that can give a broad 
set of ‘clues’.  For example Bentley’s (1999) notation of the characteristics of postmodern 
history includes: 
‘… a rejection, philosophically of the self as ‘knowing subject’ ... an allied rejection of the 
possibility of finding a singular ‘true’ picture of the external world, present or past; a 
concern to ‘de-centre’ and destabilise conventional academic subjects of enquiry; a wish to 
see canons of orthodoxy in reading and writing give way to plural readings and 
interpretations; a fascination with text itself and its relation to the reality it purports to 
represent; a drive to amplify previously unheard voices from unprivileged groups and 
peoples ... a dwelling on power and lack of it as a conditioner of intellectual as much as 
political configurations within a culture.’(p. 140) 
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Suddenly, history looks as though it may become strange, unsafe and without the boundaries 
offered by a traditional true knowable version of what has happened in the past.  What has 
been understood as true might be problematised so it is no longer recognised as it was before.  
The way of seeing and understanding the past is disorientated. History, what has gone before, 
has the chance of being shaken up to reveal different possibilities.  Acting on possibilities 
however can be challenging.   
 
One major problem is that it is not necessarily the accessibility of a ‘real’ past that is at stake, 
but that there are a wide variety of ways of viewing ‘past’, that can be recounted differently. 
The acceptance of different viewpoints hinges on the business of truth about the past.  
Ankersmit (2001) tells us that ‘each phase of historical writing can nevertheless be seen as 
the form in which a culture expresses its consciousness of its past.’ This echoes Foucault’s, ‘a 
history of the present’ must avoid the ‘writing of the past in terms of the present’. (Foucault. 
1977. p. 31)  That is to say, apart from what the historical writing produced in a period may 
say about the past, it can also be seen as the expression of how this period related to its past.  
This demonstrates that the telling of the telling of a history through time reveals that history 
stories are set within an ever changing present and open to constant retelling and re-
interpretation.  Each iteration has its own truth. 
 
Jenkins, ‘a disobedient thinker’ (2003 p. 2) problematises the concept of history, when at 
first sight he seems to be declaring history dead,  
 
‘In terms of critical and empowering thinking, my argument went, historians may no longer 
have much to say to a culture that now seems too late still to be modern and which is 
arguably so ahistorical in its practices such that modernist ways of doing history, whether in 
ideological…or academic … modes, may well be coming to a close.’ (Jenkins, 2003, p. 2) 
 
However rather than killing what is known as history entirely and once and for all, a new 
field of exploration for historicising doctorate that casts off the shackles of weasel beliefs 
about what history is, is now seen as entirely possible.  To explore the opportunities offered 
through seeing with postmodern eyes requires thinking and attitudes to scholarly history that 
are brave enough to dispense with the traditional basis of history (there is one truth, one 
history, one closed chronological time frame, one way of writing historiography) and to try 
out the attitudes outlined in Bentley’s notation of postmodern history.  This postmodern 
exploration stands in what Jenkins calls, ‘critical disobedience’ to the mainstream norms of 
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traditional history (or any other discipline) and ‘gratefully accepts and celebrates … the 
inevitable failures of historical representation / presentation,’ p.3. 
 
Jenkins is not the only academic scholar to suggest that it is time to look outside the centre of 
cultural habits of dominant discursive practices when considering the thinking and questions 
to be applied when interrogating subject matter.  Richard Rorty (1989) in Contingency, 
irony, and solidarity offers concrete suggestions in his discussion about language which he 
describes as ‘an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new 
vocabulary which vaguely promises new things’ by asking ‘try thinking of it this way or 
more specifically try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions by substituting the 
following new and possibly interesting questions’, and methods ‘to re-describe lots and lots 
of things in new ways’ (p.9). Rorty’s re-descriptions then also assumes that what is described 
is never ending, which fits well with Jenkins’ idea of openness, Rorty’s refusal of ‘a final 
vocabulary’ (p.73) and Paulson’s ‘medium of possibility’. 
 
While Jenkins acknowledges that most historians now embrace an interpretation of 
interpretive pluralism in their work, it is different to that embraced by postmodernism, and 
he considers that most historians still effectively create ‘interpretive closures’.  He proposes 
that history could take an entirely opposite route –  
‘… that in the name of interminable openness and unthought possibilities we ought to have 
an implacable opposition to every type of closure on at least two counts.  First because at 
the level of the historical text it just happens to be the case that interminable openness is 
logically unavoidable: there is no way that any historical closure can ever be achieved ….. 
And second, because such unavoidable openness allows for new disrespectful contentious, 
radical readings and rereadings, writings and rewritings of the past (the before now) to be 
produced – and this is excellent.’ (2003, p3) 
 
Jenkins does not claim to have answers.  He says ‘its refigured ways of figuring things out 
‘will never have been good enough’ (5). 
 
He continues by saying that it is impossible for historians to ever discover and write a truthful 
history – and that this is the best one can hope for.  Postmodern historians may now breathe a 
sigh of relief.  At last a well respected academic historian has enunciated what all postmodern 
historians have thought secretly.  No longer bound by the rules of traditional history, ‘we 
might want to stop doing those things and do something else…’  (Rorty, 1989, p.9) it may 
now be possible to look at ‘the before’ (Jenkins, 2003) with openness and not strive for 
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impossible outcomes.  As Nietzche said, ‘So I willed it’, it now appears that it is the time in 
history when more people are willing it.   
 
Jenkins’ book Refiguring History, demonstrates interpretive free-play, and argues that 
traditional history cannot ‘shut it down’ (p5).  This statement could sound alarm bells on 
several counts.  The interpretation of an idea labelled ‘free-play’ especially in academia could 
suggest a ‘let it all hang out and blow the consequences’ approach that has no intellectual 
rigour and no scholarship.  However the reverse is so.  Jenkins demonstrates in Refiguring 
History arguments and knowledge that can only be arrived at through perceptive 
understanding and informed interpretation of the history of history of history, and the history 
of the theory of theory.  His term ‘free-play’ perhaps does not explain adequately in itself the 
nature of a different way of viewing the world, although to look at the whole of Refiguring 
History does, and attests to the scholarly application of the principle.  However the phrase 
does hint that to refigure the history of anything, the historian or educator would do well to 
see researched material through new eyes, or with an informed yet questioning naiveté.   
 
McWilliam (1999) in discussing the ‘within reason’ aspect that the concept of play or ‘in 
play’ might bring to the academic table, says that, 
‘It is a way of refusing to settle finally on the account, the formula the set of principles … 
Moreover, as with all humour, irony depends on knowing how something works. … This 
means using reason for the very purpose of unfixing reason.’ p.178 
 
In other words, play, irony, is a tool to be used and an attitude to adopt, because as Rorty says 
cited by McWilliam, (1999, p 178) to face our central beliefs it is required that we have 
‘abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the 
reach of time and chance’. 
 
Through this questioning naiveté and with an ironic sense of ‘play’ historians could get on 
with the liberating of creative imagination directed towards the types of questions used to 
interrogate the researched material.  If this were possible interpretative closures might 
become genuinely a thing of the past and the openness that Jenkins advocates could reveal 
rather than anticipate.   It is in the failure of the traditional ‘epistemology’ that this 
postmodern invitation to radical otherness emerges and where the ‘before now’ might be 
more generously construed.  By beginning again – or by as Jenkins says bringing a 
‘disobedient disposition’ to historical (or any other) thinking, this opens up an opportunity to 
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create the ‘post modern historiography’ that Bentley considers will not be written for 30-40 
years.  The situation that Jenkins (and other post modern historians) offers is a template / blue 
print free zone and suggests the idea of ‘favourable dispositions’ towards different ways of 
imagining – or a ‘relaxed attitude to creative failure’ (2003, p. 6) it, 
‘…seeks no resolution or agreement about historic problematisations but which celebrates 
the failure of each and every one of them: what is being advocated throughout is an attitude 
that disregards convention, disobeys the authoritive voice and replaces any definitive 
closure with interminable openness, any exhaustive ending with an etcetera, and any full 
stops with an ellipsis …’ p.6 
 
and reveals entry into a different way of approaching history and in this case, the historicising 
of doctorate.   
 
Through making a mix of Foucault’s archaeological examination and genealogical strategy 
and some aspects of postmodern history, the researcher can be airlifted immediately out of a 
traditional viewpoint and into a disorientated, never ending research area that has no 
interpretative closures and where the material in the doctorate archive can be seen to behave 
differently.   
 
Suspending weasel beliefs about time when formulating the framework into which we place 
the ‘doctorate material’ might be a useful space for re-orientating this aspect of education.  
Ermarth (2001) says that the idea of historical time ‘took hold after 1800 and remains for 
most of us an almost automatic pilot. This kind of time has become the only conceivable 
kind: homogenous, infinite, unproblematic, unconfigured by exotic influences like furies, 
gods or wormholes in space.’ (p. 204).  This idea of time if it were used for examining 
‘doctorate’ assumes that doctorate will ‘produce results, explanations, knowledge, capital’ it 
relies on cause and effect and can reconcile ‘present lack for the sake of future completion’ 
(p.205).  If this is the case, then in a space with no time where statements from the doctorate 
archive are placed, there will be the possibility of a different notion about the ‘ideas of 
results, explanations, knowledge, capital’ and an audacious hope that there is union, success 
and completeness and a different type of network or inter-relationship between the items will 
emerge in the archive.    
 
This would be most disorientating event that could happen to traditional history and 
historiographers if the concept of time, with all its chains of events and chronologies 
disappeared, if the notion of time were suspended.   
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What would remain would be a spacious present.  The ‘spacious present’ would not provide 
space for judgement and material from the doctorate archive could be examined and 
interrogated within it in the interests of interrogating doctorate differently to see what is there 
and how different it is when viewed differently.  The spacious present allows ‘doctorate’ to 
speak. 
 
Into a spacious present, researched / found doctorate objects or events at ‘the first surfaces of 
their emergence’ (Foucault, 1969. p. 45) from before now could be placed.  These found 
objects, events or artefacts might be removed from their old habits, problematised, ordered or 
dispersed in any way, and examined in all their faces.  By creating splits and fissures different 
ideas could work to subvert and remove any constraints and provide toe holds for plurality 
(Jenkins. 1995. p. 95).  
 
In a spacious present it might be possible to describe and re-describe the regularities and the 
irregularities of doctorate however ‘disreputable’ the origin of the material and however 
unpalatable it is, be it in archives, or newspapers or record offices.  There could be 
discomfort where once ‘doctorate’ has been either comfortable or mildly uncomfortable.  
What will be revealed may well disturb a comfortable continuous ‘doctorate’ narrative, there 
may be no reconciliation and a lot more questions.  These questions however unsayable may 
be revealed as sayable in the spacious present.  It is certain that there will be disparate texts, 
pictures and statements about doctorate.  What is re-written or re-figured may skim some 
surfaces that can contribute to an overarching moment.  What is certain is that there will be 
no resting place and there may be no ending.   
 
 
 
 11
Bibliography 
Ankersmit, F., (2001) Historical Representation.  Stanford: Stanford University Press 
Bentley, M., (1999) Modern Historiography.  London: Routledge 
Dean, M., (1994) Critical and Effective Histories.  London: Routledge 
Ermarth, Elizabeth Deeds.  Beyond History.  Rethinking History 5 2  195-215 (2001) 
Foucault. M., (1989) The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge 
Foucault. M., (1977) Discipline and Punish.  London: Routledge 
Kemp, D. A., (1999a). New knowledge, New Opportunities: A discussion paper on higher 
education research and training.  Canberra.  AGPS 
Kemp, D. A., (1999b) Knowledge and Innovation: A policy statement on research and 
research training. Canberra.  AGPS 
Jenkins, K., (1995) On What is History? London: Routledge 
Jenkins, K., (2003) Refiguring History.  London: Routledge 
McWilliam, E., (1999) Pedagogical Pleasures.  New York.  Peter Lang. 
Munslow, A., (1997) Deconstructing History.  London: Routledge 
Munslow, A., (2003) The New History. London: Pearson Longman 
Nabakov, V., (1972) Transparent Things.  London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
Paulson, William, R., (1988) The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information. 
Ithaca and London. Cornell University Press 
Rae, I., False Start for the PhD in Australia.  Historical records of Australian Science. 14 
(129-141) 2002 
Rorty, R., (1989) Contingency, Irony and Solidarity.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Thorndyke, Lynn. (1975) University Records and Life in the Middle Ages.  New York.  The 
Norton Library 
Websites: 
BBC (2004) Honorary Doctorates for Bee Gees downloaded from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/3700931.stm.  10 May 
http://www.crikey.com.au/columnists/2002/05/09-HonoraryDocs.html downloaded May 
2004
Newspaper articles: 
‘Super PhD Loses out to Blondes and Vampires’ (Sun Herald, 13 July 2003, p.15) 
“Thesis preaches gay gospel on Jesus” (Hobart Mercury, 29 May 2003, p.2) 
